1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.
2. One seldom-considered dimension in the current debate about activereserve force-mix tradeoffs is our actual experience in calling up and using Reserve Forces. What happened in past recalls, and what does it suggest about the utility of reserve forces in future crises short of general war? This Research Memorandum examines the extant documentation in the case of Naval Reserve Forces during the past 35 years. The historical experience is not reassuring. The best of present plans and intentions notwithstanding, the historical record suggests that manpower, assets and missions which might be needed in times of crisis are of uncertain utility if consigned to the nonactive components of the Navy's force structure. The Research Memorandum discusses the reasons for this. -iii-
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INTRODUCTION
In the course of this decade, U.S. active forces are slated to grow by 9 percent, from approximately 2.06 million men and women in fiscal 1980 to 2.24 million in fiscal 1990. By contrast, current plans have the Selected Reserve components growing by 45 percent in the same tenyear period-from 869,000 military personnel in 1980 to 1.3 million in 1990-and total reserve manpower (Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve) by 51 percent. Projected growth in the Naval Selected Reserve is the most dramatic: 75 percent between 1980 and 1990. According to current plans, one-third of all available manpower in the Navy will be in its nonactive components by 1990.
Increased reliance on the reserves in the nation's "total force posture" may not end there. Even the limited, 9 percent planned growth in active force end-strengths may well not be realized, and may have to be made up in further additions to reserve strength. This is so because demographic, budgetary and instinctual Congressional pressures will favor further shifts in the "active-reserve force-mix" toward greater reserve utilization.
For one thing, the size of the manpower pool available for military service is declining: by 1992, the number of males in the prime recruiting pool, ages 17 to 21, will be 20 percent less than in 1978. Recruitment for the active forces will be, accordingly, both more difficult and more costly as the decade matures. For another thing, shifting manpower and missions from the active to the reserve components has long had a powerful appeal for much of the Congress. Personnel and retirement costs are lower for part-time reserve forces than for active forces, and lower operating tempos and training rates mean lower operating costs in peacetime. Manpower accounts, notably active duty end-strength, are attractive targets for a budget deficit-minded Congress, since unlike equipment accounts, savings from cutbacks are realized fairly quickly.
Despite a 33 percent growth in Naval Selected Reserve manpower between fiscal 1980 and fiscal 1985, the Navy lags behind the other services in the reserve "share" of its total manpower in 1985 (26 percent compared to the Army's 57 percent and the Air Force's 28 percent). (Table 1) . While growth in Naval Reserve manpower will be considerable in the next five years, the total reserve share of Navy manpower will still be only 33 percent in 1990, and the Navy Selected Reserve's share only 19 percent. (Table 2 ). For critics in the Congress, this might well not be enough, particularly as pressures mount to limit growth in active duty accounts. 
Locating a "proper" mix of active and reserve components in any service's force structure is a complex and contentious proposition. In the Navy's case, it has been the subject of a particularly intense and recurring debate for several years running. That debate will no doubt continue in the years ahead.
Two features of that debate as it pertains to the Navy are particularly striking: (1) how little experience we have had in calling up and using Naval Reserve Forces in the last 40 years; and (2) how little attention has been paid in the active-reserve mix debate to the limited experience with involuntary reserve recalls we have hadArguably, the first might explain the second: that is, that the experience with Naval Reserve recalls is so limited and so dated that it is without instructive value for present purposes. After all, the last time Naval reservists were involuntarily activated was 16 years ago, and the occasion then was a postal strike in the New York City area, not a military emergency.
The hypothesis here is somewhat different. The proposition in these pages is that past reserve recall experience counts, and that it would be foolhearty to dismiss it out of hand. The fact that Naval Reserve Forces have not been called in a host of conceivable recall situations, coupled with the mostly troubled experience when reserve forces were in fact recalled involuntarily, are perfectly germane to current active-reserve mix considerations precisely because they add a practical dimension to an otherwise abstract discussion of planning expectations. What goes into the Naval Reserves may eventually have to come out (that is, be activated involuntarily)-certainly in general war, but also conceivably in situations short of general war. An appreciation of what went right and what went wrong in past recallsand, of what, if anything can be generalized from past experience-adds an irreplaceably informative perspective to the current debate. This paper, accordingly, has two aims. The first is essentially descriptive: to reconstruct from extant documentation the historical experience with involuntary Navy reserve recalls. The documentation, like the experience, is not extensive, but enough has been located and pieced together to recount the essentials of what happened. The second aim is to identify those "lessons" from past experience which appear to be germane to current considerations, and to suggest how and in what respects this is so.
As noted already, the recall experience in the case of the Navy Reserves is not extensive. Apart from the Korea War (in which 198,000 Navy Reserve and 108,000 Marine Corps Reserve personnel were ordered to active duty in the first six months), Naval Reserve Forces have been activated involuntarily on only four occasions in the past 40-plus years: the Berlin crisis (1961); the Pueblo crisis (1968); the Vietnam build-up (1968) ; and the New York City area postal strike (1970) . Of the four, Berlin was the largest (8,000 reservists) followed by the postal strike (3,900). Marine Corps Reserves have not been activated involuntarily since the early days of Korea.
Three of these recalls are recounted here. (Given its idiosyncratic, non-defense purpose, the postal strike activation is treated only in passing.) While only Navy Reserve Forces are dealt with in these pages, it is important to note that: (1) the three recalls involved activations of reserve components of the other services as well; (2) several of the problems encountered applied equally (and in some cases more acutely) to the other services; and (3) a number of problems stemmed as much from the political decision to activate as from the military execution of the decision. It should be noted also that all of these recalls occurred in the draft era, before the adoption of the All-Volunteer Force and the companion "Total Force" concept. The significance of this last point is taken up later in these pages.
U.S. Naval reservists have volunteered for active duty in a number of circumstances and contingencies in the post-Korea years-most recently, in Grenada and when the battleship New Jersey was on station off the Lebanese coast. This paper does not deal with "voluntary recalls" (although such a history would be a valuable addition to a broader understanding of reserve utilization). The focus here is on involuntary activations exclusively, because these are most central to the Navy's force mix and force use planning and most germane to the larger debate about active-reserve force balance.
_ IT
THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
The narrative begins in 1950. The early days of the Korean War precipitated the largest U.S. reserve call-up of the postwar era: some 806,000 reservists from a base of 2.5 million (32 percent activated) augmented the 1.5 million active force. Close to 200,000 Navy reservists and 108,000 Marine Corps reserve personnel were part of the activation.
Specifics of the Naval and Marine Corps Reserves' participation have not survived as well as those pertaining to the Army Reserve and National Guard, but the Navy/Corps experience evidently mirrored that of the Army in general respects. Certainly in the Army's case, it was a haphazard callup. The Army was required to activate the organized reserves (the regular reserves and the National Guard) in entire units only. The Army's critical need, however, was not for entire units but for individual replacements, fillers and trainers, an incongruity that led to the callup of individual non-drilling reservists while entire units sat out the war at home. Nondrilling World War II veterans went before drilling nonveterans. Moreover, there was no good mesh between provisions for induction and provisions for reserve callup. As a result, reservists who were fathers, students and skilled technicians were activated, while draftees were deferred on these very same grounds. Also, the 1948 draft law deferred from induction men who joined the National Guard between the ages of 17 and 18-1/2. According to Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense, the provision was "really sort of a scandal.... It was a draft-dodging business. A boy could enlist in the National Guard and not be drafted and sent to Korea and fight."
The Korea reserve call-up was short-lived. While there were some reserve activations as late as 1954, the draft soon took over as the principal source of manpower. Some 100,000 early activated reservists were released by December 1951.
Owing in large measure to confusion, disparities and perceived inequities in the early Korea callups, the Congress reorganized the reserves in 1952. Congress made further adjustments following the war in the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. These were supplemented by administrative refinements by the Eisenhower administration in 1957.
By the late 1950s, the current reserve structure was largely in place. For immediate purposes here, this consisted of two principal reserve categories: a Selected Reserve, whose members train regularly (usually one weekend a month and two weeks each summer); and an Individual Ready Reserve, whose members are serving out the balance of -6-their military service obligation and who are legally available for involuntary recall as individuals.
Korea was the only recall of the 1950s. The reserves remained a political issue-Eisenhower spent his last year in office inveighing against excessive reserve strength that was of no military value and that cost an additional $80 million a year-but were not a serious factor in military planning. In the case of Naval Reserve Forces, the next recall was during the Berlin crisis of 1961, followed by the two Vietnam-era activations (table 3) . BERLIN (1961 BERLIN ( -1962 The Berlin crisis call-ups operated under the specific authority of SJ Res 120, passed on 1 August 1961, which authorized the President to order to active duty, without the consent of the persons concerned, any reserve unit, or any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, for not more than twelve consecutive months. The resolution also placed a ceiling of 250,000 on the numbers of Ready Reservists who could be on active duty without their consent (other than for training) at a given time.
The resolution was passed on the heels of a series of speeches by President Kennedy in July, following his June meeting with Khruschev in Vienna. Khruschev had repeated earlier Soviet demands to "solve the occupation status of West Berlin making it a free city", and to limit access to West Berlin solely at the sufferance of the East German state.
In his speeches in July, Kennedy stated with increasing forcefulness that the United States was prepared to risk war for its rights in Berlin. On July 25, he called publicly for increasing the draft, calling up reserves, and increasing substantially the defense budget and the size of the three military services. Kennedy had been urged at a National Security Council meeting by Vice President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk to declare a national emergency, but the step was promptly rejected as too drastic under the circumstances.
The Kennedy administration intended an overall "Berlin crisis" strength increase of 300,000 to be obtained by the following measures in order of preference and priority: voluntary active duty enlistments; increased draft calls; involuntary extensions of active duty; and (notably last) recalls of reservists. Its actual performance in these regards was a 328,000 strength increase by early 1962 composed of: 70,000 voluntary enlistments; 47,000 through increased draft calls; 63,000 by involuntary extensions of duty; 148,000 recalled reservists.
-7- -8-While the original plan regarding reservists was to limit the recall to members of the Selected Reserve who were on a paid-drill status, this was met only partially. Of the 148,000 recalled reservists: -66,000 had served only six months active duty; -54,000 were on paid drill status; -28,000 had served more than six years active duty and were not on paid drill status.
The Navy Reserves' share of the call-ups was 8,357 of 155,800 total called; and 8,020 of the 147,849 who actually reported and served. All activated units and recalled personnel were given 30 days notice to report.
Forty Reserve DDs and DEs (13 destroyers and 27 destroyer escorts) were placed on active duty, and many of the unit recalls were to man these.
Five VP and 13 VS squadrons with reserve crews were also activated for ASW.
From this followed the mix of reserve individuals selected for the callup. Of the Navy reservists called, 4,348 were surface reservists, and 3,995 were air reservists. Approximately 6,400 were members of Selected Reserve units; 1,957 were not attached to Selected Reserve units and were added to augment Naval Air Reserve units. Not all of the 8,000+ were involuntary call-ups, but the percentage which volunteered is evidently lost to history. In addition, 552 Navy reserve officers and 18 enlisted already on active duty for training voluntarily extended, and 357 officers and 298 enlisted were extended involuntarily.
The call-up took four months to execute. The sequence of major actions was as follows. Two days after SJ Res 120 was enacted on August 1, the Secretary of the Navy called publicly on inactive Navy reservists to volunteer for active duty. On August 9, the Chief of Naval Personnel submitted to the Navy Secretary a plan for the force build-up, including the Reserve recall. Documentation as to what recalled units and individuals actually did while on active duty is skimpy. Broadly speaking, the 40 reserve ships were assigned to regular operating forces, carrying out assignments in the Baltic, Caribbean and South China Sea. Some unspecified (but evidently large) number took part in splash-down duties in the Pacific associated with John Glenn's first space flight. Activated air units for ASW had readiness problems (manning and equipment), and were largely confined to limited surveillance missions.
Subsequent assessments were mixed. Publicly the Naval Reserve's part of the reserve mobilization got favorable reviews. Secretary McNamara, testifying on September 13, 1962, thought the Navy's to be the better showing of the services-a phenomenon he attributed to his mistaken impression that all 8,000 Navy Reservists were volunteers who had specially trained for their active duty assignments. Internal documentation (much of it anonymous or incomplete drafts, both Navy and OSD) was more critical, but also scattershot. An internal Navy memo of November 11, 1962 spoke cryptically that "some shortages and some misalignment of skills were apparent in the recalled units." An OSD assessment faulted weak leadership among some Reserve petty officers; said individual "volunteer reserve fillers were particularly weak;" and "in some cases, active duty personnel were poorly qualified for the same reason." A principal complaint (echoed later in the Pueblo crisis) was that squadron/unit COs were selected and designated based on local knowledge of the individuals' capabilities rather than through the OCNO. Premature press releases (another problem to return in Pueblo) were blamed for creating confusion among reservists as to who was and who was not being recalled. An across-the-board shortage of aircraft parts and an underfill in maintenance assignments-along with an assessment that many Selected Reservists did not understand their obligations, especially in partial mobilizations-were several times repeated.
Paradoxically, the crisis stage of the Berlin crisis was over before the first Naval reservists reported for duty. With the Soviet/East German construction of the Berlin wall, Khruschev solved his most pressing problem, the mass exodus to the West, and lost interest in intensifying the crisis. The wall also solved Kennedy's problem, by shifting the subject from Allied access rights to containment of East German refugees. In October, Khruschev withdrew his earlier deadline for resolving the occupation status question by the end of the year; according to Khruschev, "the western powers were showing some understanding of the situation, and we were inclined to seek a solution...."
On 1 August 1962, the Navy released the 8,343 reservists who had been called to active duty the previous fall. The Navy also announced that the 40 destroyers would remain with the active fleet.
CUBA (1962)
The Cuba Missile Crisis of October 1962 is interesting here for what did not happen. Chiefly a naval operation, no Navy reserves were called.
As noted, on August 1, 1962 the navy released the 8,343 Navy reservists called the previous fall. On September 13, 1962, Secretary McNamara went before the House and Senate in support of HJ Res 876 and SJ Res 224-the purpose of which was to give the President the special reserve call-up powers he had had with respect to Berlin, this time regarding Cuba. According to SJ Res 224 (which passed on October 3):
...notwithstanding any other provision of law, until February 28, 1963, the President may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, or any member, of the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months. However, not more than 150,000 members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty (other than for training) without their consent, under this section at any one time.
Possibly because it had just released reservists, the administration stressed that it sought the call-up power only for contingency purposes. McNamara told the Congress there were "no specific plans to use the authority." In fact, there was a reserve call-up between October 27 and November 1, 1962, but it was limited to Air Force reserves: 14,200 were called; 14,025 reported and served.
THE PUEBLO CRISIS (1968)
Independent of special "crisis" provisions, there was throughout this period permanent legislation of two types authorizing the President to activate reservists, both embodied in 10 United States Code sec. 673a.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may order to active duty any member of the Ready Reserve of an armed force who--(1) is not assigned to, or participating satisfactorily in, a unit of the Ready Reserve; (2) has not fulfilled his statutory reserve obligation; and (3) has not served on active duty for a total of 24 months.
In time of emergency declared by the President, any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve may be ordered for active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months. Not more than 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty (other than for training) without their consent under this section.
As noted, President Kennedy did not use this authority in the Berlin and Cuban crises. President Johnson also did not use it in the Pueblo crisis and the subsequent Vietnam build-up. Instead, Johnson relied on a provision in the 1967 DoD Authorization Bill (PL 89-687):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until June 30, 1968, the President may, when he deems it necessary, order to active duty any unit of the Ready Reserve of an armed force for a period of not to exceed twenty-four months.
"Unit" was interpreted to be restricted to only those units which are organized and trained to be mobilized and serve on active duty as units.
The Pueblo call-up (January 1968) overlapped somewhat with the broader Vietnam reserve call-up (which began in earnest in April 1968), especially with regard to Air Force and Army reserve recalls. On the heels of Pueblo, the Air Force activated 14,000 air reservists, sending 7,000 to South Korea and South Vietnam. The Army called up 19,763 reservists in April and sent 10,000 to Vietnam, but this evidently was in response more to the Tet offensive in January than to any considerations connected with Pueblo. In the Navy's case, on the other hand, the two call-ups were more sharply distinguished.
The Pueblo crisis Navy reserve call-up was on 24-hour notice, and consisted of six Naval Reserve Air Squadrons (3 fighter, 3 The precise purpose of the call-up was not very clear. A later (September 16, 1968) DoD news release said it was "done to improve the aviation strength of the Navy and to provide additional resources to meet contingencies that might have arisen." The missions expected of the recalled units were undecided at the time of recall and at least for a while thereafter. (According to an undated, unsigned Navy memorandum evidently written not too much later, there was a short period of time from the January recall-when reserve units were undergoing refresher training-"when policy decisions concerning their use were held in abeyance until a careful evaluation of various courses of action could be completed.") Why these six squadrons, then, was something of a mystery. A subsequent, unsigned assessment by OSD offered that "unit selections were hurried and based on readiness factors," yet the recalled squadrons were equipped with carrier-incompatible aircraft (36 A-4s and 36 F-8s) and, against an authorized strength of 1,115, had an assigned strength of only 593 (53 percent).
In any case, none of the six left the United States during the period of activation, although the Navy announced that all squadrons were scheduled for deployment when the decision was made to release them from active duty. The six were released from active duty on November 1, 1968. The release was not, however, connected with any indication of early release of the Pueblo or its crew. The best that was offered was that, according to DoD's September news release, "current commitments can be met by the Regular Air Units, [and] the Navy has decided to release the Reserve Air units to inactive status."
The Pueblo activation had several sets of problems. For one thing, it encountered litigation by at least one complaining reservist.
(The complainant, a TAR, learning that he would be required to perform sea duty with his assigned squadron, filed suit claiming that in accepting his TAR assignment he had been assured of no sea duty. The Navy settled by acceding to his wishes to be immediately released from active duty.) For another thing, there were several political problems. Critics of the call-up-most vocally Congressman Schweiker of Pennsylvania-pointed out that active duty Navy pilots were being released while reservists were being involuntarily called. (This, evidently, was because, unlike Kennedy in Berlin, Johnson had not sought authority to involuntarily extend active tours.) For a third, the Navy was still having technical problems with the idea of partial mobilization. Said one OSD after-the-fact assessment:
1. There may have been such litigation in the Berlin call-up, but this is not evident in the extant documentation.
On the Navy side, the Naval Air Reserve was not geared for a partial mobilization. Mobilizing only three fighter squadrons and three attack squadrons-rather than implementing the Navy's LCP [Logistics Support Plan] in its entirety-presented some problems.
Still, the most severe set of problems concerned matching the recalled units and personnel to missions with the active fleet. Here, there were several prominent shortfalls.
1. While all six recalled squadrons were carrier units, they were carrier-incompatible in terms of aircraft. While ostensibly picked because of readiness measures, these measures counted only percentages of equipment and manning fill-not compatibility with active duty assignment requirements. The reserve squadrons' F-8As and A-4Bs were not combat capable aircraft. The F-8s could not operate off carriers without several gear modifications, and, in any case, they had manual fire control systems which limited their operations to daylight, clear-air conditions. The A-4B had no Shrike or Walleye capability, no armor plate, and its radar limitations precluded contour flying. At best, it could handle only iron bombs.
2. In the Navy reserve, four "sets" of pilots flew one set of airplanes. While this was cost-effective in a training situation, it was an extraordinary complication in terms of responding to a partial mobilization.
3. The recalled squadrons had necessarily to be augmented by individuals from reserve maintenance units and weapons training units. There was, however, no authority to recall these individuals. Consequently, the mobilized reserve units were critically short of maintenance people on call-up. Existing maintenance skill level was, at the same time, low. 4. Unit fill-out had to be jerry-rigged. With these squadrons at only 53 percent manning against authorized strength, the Navy had to produce at least 542 additional people. To do this, it brought in 206 volunteers, earmarked 229 TARs for the units, and assigned 107 personnel from "Navy resources." 5. Squadron pilots, while qualified (recalled pilots had an average of 1,372 jet hours and 188 carrier landings) still required carrier requalification, along with considerable amounts of other training (live firings and the like).
Beyond this, there were glitches of a general character which did not help matters. A February 29, 1968 site visit by OSD Reserve Affairs officials to one activated squadron (VA 776) reported that "the unit was well on its way toward operational status" (this more than one month after the 24-hour activation), but noted that, of 12 assigned aircraft, 2 were still undergoing minor maintenance and one was "away because of trouble." It also noted that "this, like other similar Navy units, would require actual carrier practice with A4E's before it could take its place into the Navy's rotational program in Air PAC." Housing problems were experienced, such that recalled reservists had to be put up in local, off-base hotels, two to a room, for much of the early months of recall. Congressman Schweiker cited reports that VF-931 had been mobilized in 48 hours and had then waited four months with neither practice aircraft nor operational duties. Schweiker also challenged the rationale for the recall of these units, characterizing the activation as an "outrageous sham" and an "exercise to gain extra manpower." "These men were simply going to be used as routine replacements in the Mediterranean-an area totally removed from where the Pueblo was seized." (New York Times, Sept. 17, 1968, p. 11) .
A subsequent (Feb. 10, 1969 ) Navy BuPers memorandum-for-record suggested that the call-up and later release had not had especially bad consequences in terms of reservists' morale and commitment-as this was measured by their "reaffiliation" rate. Officers in the Air Reserve squadrons reaffiliated with their units after release from active duty at a rate of 56 percent; enlisted personnel, at a rate of 54 percent. By 1968, the Johnson administration was under considerable political pressure to commit reserves (especially paid-drill reservists) to Vietnam. Draft-deferred reservists sitting out the war at home while men were being drafted from civilian life to meet expanding force requirements did not sit well with growing numbers of people.
In Executive Order 11406 (April 10, 1968) , the President authorized the Secretary of Defense to "order any unit in the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty for a period of not to exceed 24 months." (The legal authority was the same legislation used for Pueblo, and it was due to expire in June.) The following day, the Secretary of Defense delegated the authority to the Service Secretaries, by memorandum, subject to the following ceilings: Army, 20,034; Navy and Marine Corps, 1,028; Air Force 3,488.
Combined with the Pueblo call-up a few months earlier, the springtime activation produced roughly 37,000 reservists for active duty. To 35,280 reservists called-up between January 26 and May 13, 1,600 Army IRRs were ordered to active duty. Some 500 reservists volunteered as well.
The Navy's contribution consisted of two Reserve Mobile Construction Battalions (RMCBs, or SeaBees). These were activated in May 1968, and released from active duty in April and May 1969.
The choice of RMCBs was influenced, not by any particular crisis, but by problems in the SeaBees 1 rotation base. SeaBees already had one of the highest exposure rates in Vietnam. With the deployment of the 12th Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCBB) on February 14, 1968, the Navy's attention focused sharply on disparities between SeaBees' deployment exposure and that of other personnel. Maintaining 12 battalions deployed with the 1968 active force level of 19 battalions meant that SeaBees would be deployed in Vietnam 18 months of every 24 months, vice 12 months for most other personnel.
One conceivable redress-individual rotation-was rejected as not cost-effective. According to various internal memoranda, the cost per man of individual rotation was put at $176 compared to $165 if whole units were rotated. Also, a greater end-strength requirement was projected for individual than for unit rotation to achieve the same steady-state strength: 24,309 individuals compared with 22,226 if done by unit. The preferred course was to maintain unit rotation, but to expand the base of NMCBs from 19 to 21. Coming on the heels of EO 11406, the decision was to make up the difference by activating two RMCBs.
The two reserve units selected were MCB 12 (1st Naval District, headquartered in Boston) and MCB 22 (8th Naval District, headquartered in New Orleans). A total of 1,028 unit-associated reserve personnel were recalled; to these, an additional 24 reserve officers and 738 enlisted reservists were to be attached as augmentees. The order to active duty was for a maximum of 24 months. All were to report within 30 days of the date of alert for activation.
Unlike the Naval Reserve air squadrons called a few months earlier, the SeaBees units were in fact deployed overseas, and to Vietnam. RMCB 12, activated in May, went to Southeast Asia from September 1968 to April 1969, and was deactivated May 14, 1969. RMCB 22, also activated in May, was deployed to South Vietnam from August 1968 to March 1969, and was deactivated on April 29. In their Vietnam stay, the units took losses in 4 WIA, one accidental death, and one accidental injury.
While the Navy's reserve call-up did not spark any litigation (a point of some pride in internal correspondence at the time), the overall call-up did. By June, nine lawsuits (3 Army, 6 Air Force) challenged the legality of the recall-on grounds ranging from unconstitutionality to violation of contract.
Still, the RMCB activations were not without problems of their own. Contemporary and subsequent assessments underlined that the mobilized units had distortions in the rank-and-experience spread, notably, an excess number of enlisted personnel in higher (petty officer) grade levels. The RMCBs had little mobilization equipment, and difficulties in outfitting them in time for deployment were avoided only by diverting ordnance and communications equipment initially procured for other units. Moreover, deployment was far from a quick-order affair; it came 3 to 4 months after the units were activated.
Subsequent assessments of the overall call-up were not dissimilar from those of the past. In terms of "lessons learned" from the mobilizations of 1968, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs offered the following insight in an internal review in 1969: "There is a direct relationship between support provided reserve units and their readiness time for deployment subsequent to mobilization." An anonymous, undated assessment entitled "Effects of January and May orders to Active Duty" distilled the experience into three "lessons:"
(1) a need for better leadership training for NCOs moving up through the non-prior-service reserve enlistment program;
(2) "careful evaluation of units selected could have helped in certain instances": (3) "the readiness of units with a high percentage of equipment and personnel authorized was notably better than [of] those without same." POSTSCRIPT (1968) The burst of call-up activity in the first half of 1968 was neither maintained nor repeated in the second half. The two RMCBs stayed in Vietnam through early 1969, but the Navy announced the pending release of the six Naval Air Units on September 16, 1968. At the same time, it announced that 30,000 Navy enlisted personnel (those serving 2x4 tours: 2 years active, four years Selected Reserve) would be released early from active duty between October 1 and December 31, 1968. The release, the Navy acknowledged, was driven wholly by cost factors. Mustering out the 30,000 would save $48 million, a useful spending cut for FY 1969 in order for the Navy to comply with the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 . External events at the time played no role. The Pueblo and its crew were still in North Korean hands (the crew was released on December 22, 1968); nothing of any notable difference had occurred in the fighting in Vietnam.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
That past callups have borne any real, discrete connection to the external events which supposedly triggered them is not evidenced by the historical record. It may be that the mere fact of a reserve callup signals U.S. resolve to an adversary, but the message did not seem notably persuasive to the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese, and may or may not have had much influence on Soviet behavior in Berlin. Interestingly, the one callup which does seem to have had some impact on the triggering event was in response to the New York City postal strike-the strike ended within three days of the activation.
Along similar lines, the choices of units and individuals to be activated did not, in two of the three cases, correlate in any obvious fashion with external triggering events. Why 40 destroyers in the Berlin crisis and 6 air squadrons in the Pueblo callup is by no means self-evident. The Vietnam callup did not have a discrete external trigger; the Navy was able to use an unfocused recall authority to deal with a long-standing rotation problem.
In each case, there was a notable and candidly discussed aversion to employ callup authority when this meant declaration of a national emergency (as it does in permanent legislation). In these cases (and in Cuba as well) the administration sought special, one-time authorizations which did not require such a declaration. In discussing the utility of such a special provision in the Cuban Missile crisis, McNamara and the two Armed Services Committee were quite explicit in expressing concerns that a declaration of national emergency would be dangerously (or at least prematurely) provocative, unnecessarily arousing domestically, and too blunderbuss in terms of the psychology and machinery that would be set in motion.
In none of these cases was the track record in terms of reserve readiness and capability particularly inspiring. Time was not a critical factor. This was fortunate, because swiftness of activationreporting-deployment was not a hallmark.
The show-rates in these recalls were respectable, although in two of the three (Berlin and Vietnam) 30 days notice was provided, and in all three various exemptions (personal or community hardship, nearing end of tour, etc.) were authorized. Still, skill mismatches, and either inexperienced NCOs or too many NCOs, were evident in the three.
All of these callups occurred in the draft era, prior to the adoption of the All-Volunteer Force, and before embrace of the companion "Total Force" concept. This obviously dates the experience, but it is 1. Such was the case with the other services as well. In the 1961 Berlin callup, activated Army and Guard units averaged only 68 percent of required personnel and some took up to a year to achieve combat readiness. Close to half of the Army reservists activated for Vietnam had critical skill shortcomings, and nearly one-fifth were not qualified for service. interesting in its own right. Since the Total Force Policy, with its emphasis on reserve forces to provide immediate support to active forces in times of crises, there have been no involuntary activations of reserve forces. This has not been for lack of international incidents or crises involving U.S. forces. Between 1976 and 1984, U.S. Navy and Marine forces alone responded to 41 incidents or crises (23 in the first four years of the Reagan administration), with the average duration of response in some geographical areas in excess of 100 days (table 4) . Included were the hostage crisis in Iran (October 1979 -January 1981 , the war between Iran and Iraq (October 1980 -February 1981 , October 1983 , the invasion of Grenada (October -November 1983) , and the U.S.-Syrian confrontation involving Lebanon (August 1983 -April 1984 . In each case, active naval forces were stretched, deployments were altered and/or extended, exercises were cancelled, leaves were cancelled or delayed, but no reserves were activated. Why was this so? Several possible reasons suggest themselves. First, a number of these crises and incidents were low-level, required a minimum show of force, and were not suitable occasions for something as drastic as a reserve callup. But this was not always the case, and besides, it begs an important question about reserve applicability to the kinds of situations the Navy commonly faces. Second, a number of these incidents arose too quickly for reserve forces to play a part. This was no doubt the case in the Grenada invasion, but it leaves unanswered why, in prolonged crisis responses (such as the Iranian hostage crisis), reserve assets were not deployed to gradually replace active elements and personnel. Third, and perhaps more importantly, the same political reluctance to initiate a reserve callup in the past, and the special reluctance to invoke a declaration of national emergency, may well pertain in the present as well-the "Total Force" philosophy notwithstanding. That is, an involuntary recall may set in motion a too politically and psychologically explosive chain of circumstances.
One other lesson from the past may pertain as well. An ability (on paper, at least) to conduct a full reserve mobilization does not appear to translate easily into an equal ability to effect a partial mobilization. This at least seems to have been the lesson of Pueblo (and, to a lesser extent, of Berlin and Vietnam). In part this may be because reserve mobilization planning is predicated on assumptions of complete authority (to extend tours, recall individuals as well as units, capture or cannibalize equipment either not specifically designated or designated for other units), whereas the authorities actually in place for limited callups may be only partial. In part, it may derive from the greater logistical difficulties involved in discrete, highly particularized, and not easily-planned-for partial callups. At bottom, it may also be a manifestation of the phenomenon that the worst-case scenario (in this case, full mobilization for general war) is often the best-case scenario-precisely because there are few ambiguities and the effort is all-out.
Nothing in the historical experience suggests that missions and assets applicable only to general war should not be lodged in the reserve components, or that, by doing so, the missions themselves would be at risk. (Nothing in the history suggests the contrary either, however.) But the experience does strongly suggest that manpower, assets and missions which might be called upon in circumstances and crises short of general war are much less likely to be ready and available, or to be called upon, if not in the active forces. This is particularly so in the case of the Navy, which is heavily called upon for crisis responses. And this, precisely, is a highly pertinent consideration in the active-reserve force mix debate.
